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ABSTRACT: This paper motivates two bases for ascribing
propositional semantic knowledge (or something knowledgelike): first, because it’s necessary to rationalize linguistic action; and, second, because it’s part of an empirical theory that
would explain various aspects of linguistic behavior. The semantic knowledge ascribed on these two bases seems to differ in content, epistemic status, and cognitive role. This raises the question:
how are they related, if at all? The bulk of the paper addresses
this question. It distinguishes a variety of answers and their varying philosophical and empirical commitments.
1. INTRODUCTION

It’s uncontroversial that in some sense competent speakers possess
knowledge of what expressions mean and that this semantic knowledge plays some central role in linguistic production and comprehension. What’s less obvious is the nature of this knowledge and how its
role should be characterized. One fundamental question is whether
and to what extent semantic knowledge is propositional or practical:
whether it is knowledge-that, knowledge-how, some combination of
the two, or something else altogether.1
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In what follows, I consider two strategies for arguing that the
semantic knowledge possessed and deployed by normal mature human speakers of a native language importantly includes propositional
knowledge (knowledge-that)—or at least something propositionalattitude-like. The first strategy focuses on language use as rational
activity. It argues that, in central cases, the reasons for which normal mature human language users engage in a speech act include or
are based upon propositional semantic beliefs (that typically amount
to knowledge). The second focuses on cognitivist causal accounts of
linguistic behavior. It argues that a leading empirical account of various features of linguistic behavior posits propositional knowledge (or,
cognition) of a compositional semantic theory. I elaborate on these
strategies presently—just enough to motivate them, not enough fully
to defend them. For the main purpose of this paper is not to assess
these strategies, but to raise a question if it turns out that they succeed.
It is natural to wonder whether the knowledge thereby posited coincides: whether the semantic knowledge that in part rationalizes linguistic activity is or overlaps with the semantic knowledge causally
implicated in linguistic behavior according to this leading empirical
account. Indeed, it’s natural to expect, or at least hope, that they do—
especially, though not only, if one maintains that reasons are causes.
This expectation might constitute part of a larger hope that, as the
sciences of the mind progress, our conception of ourselves as rational
agents and our understanding of ourselves as empirical objects will
smoothly integrate. Consideration of specific proposals concerning elements of language use and linguistic competence allows us to assess
one aspect of one form of this aspiration—though we must then be
wary of drawing general conclusions from the particular case.2
In the case at hand, there is an apparent mismatch—in content,
epistemic status, and cognitive role-between the semantic knowledge
that the two strategies ascribe. The semantic knowledge that rationalizes linguistic behavior can be to a significant extent characterized homophonically, can be warrantedly self-ascribed without reliance on 3 rd person evidence, and is—perhaps must be—accessible to consciousness. The semantic knowledge posited by empirically well-grounded
cognitivist accounts of semantic competence, on the other hand, is typ-
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ically non-homophonic, cannot be warrantedly self-ascribed without
reliance on 3 rd -person evidence, and seems in large part inaccessible
to consciousness. This apparent mismatch might lead one to conclude
that we possess two distinct kinds of semantic knowledge, both of
which play some role in explaining linguistic behavior. If so, one wants
to understand what relation, if any, they have to one another.
The main goal of this paper, then, is to put onto the table this “relation” question. What is the relation between, for example, our potentially rationalizing knowledge that ‘Every person ponders’ means that,
and is true if and only if, every person ponders, and our hypothesized
(tacit) knowledge that that sentence, or a structure appropriately related to it, is true if and only if the cardinality of the set of persons,
once one removes people also in the set of ponderers, equals zero?
After sketching the two strategies for ascribing semantic knowledge,
I distinguish various answers and outline their varying empirical and
philosophical commitments.
One quick preliminary. To simplify exposition, I abstract away from
a variety of important aspects of language and language use orthogonal
to my topic. In particular, I ignore for the most part context-sensitivity
and pragmatically communicated content, and I limit my examples to
declarative sentences used to enter assertions. Any plausible account of
semantic knowledge would of course have to square itself with the full
range of relevant phenomena; and, while there are those who doubt
that propositional accounts can be thus squared, there are also wellknown (and varying) proposals for doing so. If these complications
can’t be accommodated, then the “relation” question is poorly posed.
But, assuming they can be, the “relation” question remains; and that’s
what I wish to focus on here. It should not be concluded, however, that
the “relation” question is thus only of interest to those who maintain
that these complications can be accommodated—and, indeed, more
generally, accept the ascription of both kinds of semantic knowledge.
For of course difficulties addressing the “relation” question might supply further, independent grounds to those who are dubious.3
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2. TWO STRATEGIES FOR ASCRIBING PROPOSITIONAL SEMANTIC
KNOWLEDGE
2.1.

Rationality and semantic knowledge

That we possess or can readily acquire homophonic propositional semantic knowledge might seem too obvious to bear discussion. Don’t
we know that ‘water’ refers to water and that ‘2+2=4’ means that, and
is true if and only if, 2+2=4? It’s a further question, however, whether
this kind of knowledge plays a central role in the production and comprehension of speech: various thinkers have denied that it does.4 Our
first strategy counters that such knowledge does play a central role by
focusing on language use as rational activity.
Consider, to begin with, the following relatively minimal set of
claims. Our language use is typically intentional. What’s more, although it’s of course not intentional under all descriptions (e.g., under descriptions of changes in the articulatory system or in the ambient air), it’s typically intentional under some description of the words
uttered.5 Typical instances of intentional behavior—i.e., actions—are
done for reasons. To act for a reason is to have beliefs, desires, and/or
perhaps other attitudes that explain, from one’s own perspective, why
one so acts. So, when the action is an instance of typical language
use and thus intentional under a description of the words uttered, the
speaker utters those words for a reason (or reasons). These reasons—
again, in the typical case—might include a desire to perform some
speech act, typically with some further, non-linguistic end in mind. For
example, someone might intentionally utter the sentence ’There are apples in the fridge’ in order to assert that there are apples in the fridge
and to get the hearer to retrieve the apples.6
If one grants these claims, one has already committed speakers to
rationalizing propositional knowledge concerning the relation of sentences and content.7 A further claim is that beliefs concerning what uttering an expression can do (including what speech acts their utterance
can be used to effect) are in part grounded in beliefs concerning what
expressions mean, at least so far as normal mature speakers are concerned. Thus, it’s because the speaker knows that the sentence means
there are apples in the fridge that she believes uttering ‘There are apples
in the fridge’ is a way of asserting that there are apples in the fridge.
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Moreover, her belief that her audience also knows this in part warrants
her belief that uttering the sentence will raise the likelihood of her getting an apple. Propositional semantic knowledge thus provides part of
her reason to think that so acting is a good way of achieving her ends.
So one might claim. But someone skeptical of propositional semantic knowledge’s role in linguistic behavior might grant that practical reasoning of this sort (perhaps after further articulation) would
be sound, and yet deny that it captures the reasons for which normal
human speakers in fact act. That there is a reason for acting or for a
belief, even one available to an agent, does not entail that the agent in
fact acts or believes for that reason. Even if we may justifiably attribute
such reasons to a speaker who acts as a result of explicit deliberation of
this sort, it’s a familiar anti-cognitivist (or, anti-intellectualist) charge
that generalizing from such cases is illicit.8
So, how might a proponent of rationalizing semantic knowledge
buttress her claims, beyond noting the obvious softening-up point that
we often allow that agents who have not engaged in conscious deliberation nonetheless act for reasons? One tack9 is to note that there
are circumstances in which a speaker, having accepted as reasonable a
question of the form ‘Why did you utter S in order to A?’, would naturally answer with a semantic claim expressive of a semantic belief. But
if speakers more-or-less spontaneously claim that they act for such-andsuch reasons, that’s prima facie reason to think that they do. Further,
it’s not hard to construct scenarios in which it would be natural for a
speaker to explain why she acted by expressing a semantic belief that
exhibits the three features I listed in my introduction. And these scenarios are such that one can indeed justifiably generalize from them to
the typical case—as I now explain.
Suppose, for example, X and Y—competent German speakers—are
conversing. Listening in is sub-competent German speaker SUB. SUB,
like X, is a competent English speaker; but SUB is still trying to work
himself up to an intermediate-level grasp of German. Now, SUB observes X utter ‘Es sind Äpfel im Kühlschrank.’ SUB asks X why she uttered or said that. X answers: “I wanted to let Y know where she could
find a snack.” SUB says: “But why did you put it that way? It sounded
like you said something about apes. Help me out here; you know I’m
trying to improve my German.” X answers: “No, ‘Äpfel’ means apples,

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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not apes. ‘Es sind Äpfel im Kühlschrank’ means there are apples in the
fridge.”
Here it seems we have a circumstance in which it would be quite
natural for someone to advert to a rationalizing semantic belief. X
needn’t be a linguist or philosopher of language or otherwise especially
reflective to come up with her explanation—nor need she expend any
noticeable effort in arriving at it. Of course, the mere fact that X offers an explanation of her action does not entail that the explanation
is correct. Like everyone else, X is no doubt fallible about her beliefs
and reasons and potentially subject to post facto confabulation. But
to the extent that our expressions and self-ascriptions possess a measure of epistemic authority, there’s reason to credit X’s claims, pending
reason to think otherwise. Correlatively, an anti-cognitivism that overrules agents’ own explanations is committed to a kind of error theory.
In the case at hand, I take it that it’s prima facie plausible that X indeed
knows that ‘Es sind Äpfel im Kühlschrank’ means there are apples in
the fridge and correctly identifies part of her reason for action in expressing this knowledge to SUB. Moreover, this prima facie plausibility
remains whatever X’s attitudes concerning more controversial (possibly
also semantic) questions—such as, for example, whether, for her utterance to be true, there must be more than one (more-or-less complete
and whole) apple in the fridge, or whether one would suffice.10
Now, from such cases, we can generalize to typical cases of language use. We can generalize, first, to otherwise similar cases in which
no one like SUB happens to interject. The presence of eavesdropping
SUB merely creates a clear circumstance in which X can informatively
articulate the semantic reason for her action. But had SUB not been
around, surely the reason would still have played the same role. After all, for all I’ve said, X might not even have been aware of SUB’s
presence until SUB jumped in with his question. Second, we can generalize to cases in which the speaker doesn’t happen to be bilingual.
To be sure, on account of their multi-lingualism, bilinguals may differ
from monolinguals in their meta-linguistic capacities.11 But it would
be a bold claim to maintain that bilinguals, on account of their bilingualism, possess rationalizing semantic knowledge of the sort X articulates whereas normal mature monolingual speakers don’t. Granted,
if X were not competent also in English, she could not have expressed
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her semantic belief to SUB as she did. But nonetheless it seems she
still would have known that which she in fact did express—viz., that
which a monolingual German could express by an utterance of “Es sind
Äpfel im Kühlschrank” bedeutet dass es Äpfel im Kühlschrank sind.’ For
why should we think that she only knows that which is expressed by
this German ‘bedeutet-dass’ sentence because as a matter of fact she
also speaks English? If it’s not on account of her bilingualism that she
knows it, then there is reason to generalize to monolingual German
speakers who happen not to be able to—and also might not have the
occasion to—express a semantic belief to someone like SUB in the way
X does (i.e., in English).
Finally, these semantic beliefs possess the three characteristics I
listed in my introduction. First, they can be characterized homophonically: in SUB-like cases, the expression of semantic belief can be translated by a homophonic meaning-sentence, as with the homophonic
German ‘bedeutet-dass’ sentence above. The case was constructed with
X expressing her semantic belief non-homophonically (in English about
German) only so that it could be apparent how, in the right circumstances, its expression can be informative and thus entirely natural.
But nonetheless the belief she expressed is also homophonically characterizable.12
Second, one doesn’t require third-person evidence (evidence of the
sort someone else would need) in order to self-ascribe these semantic beliefs. X’s knowledge of what she believes and its rationalizing
role is immediate. She need not advert to behavioral facts available as
well to her conversational partners, more subtle psycholinguistic data,
acquisition studies, cross-linguistic facts, or what have you.13
Third, these semantic beliefs are accessible to consciousness, since,
after all, mature speakers are able to articulate them. That some speakers may never find themselves in a position to articulate them informatively, at least using a sentence that can be translated homophonically
like X’s, is neither here nor there. Armed with an ancillary premise,
one might argue for an even stronger conclusion. For example, some
forms of epistemic internalism entail that these beliefs, in order to play
their rationalizing role, must be accessible to consciousness. (Cf. fn.
22 below.) Be that as it may, the claim advanced here is only that for
normal mature human speakers of a native language such rationalizing
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knowledge in fact is consciously accessible.
2.2.

Cognitivist account of semantic competence

Let’s turn now to the second advertised basis for positing propositional
semantic knowledge that plays a central role in linguistic behavior.
Here I simply retail and take at face value a well-known empirical
strategy (albeit by no means the consensus view)—that of cognitivist
truth-theoretic accounts of semantic competence.
It is often noted that human semantic competence, like human syntactic competence, is productive, creative, and systematic: we understand an indefinitely large number of sentences, we readily understand
novel sentences, and our understanding in various ways is systematic
so that, for example, someone who understands ‘The shoe is behind the
book’ will also understand ‘The book is behind the shoe,’ etc. A wellknown hypothesis is that the best explanation of these facts is that
what speakers know about linguistic meaning exhibits compositionality: the meaning of a complex expression is a function of its syntactic structure and the meanings of its constituents. Neo-Davidsonians,
for example, hypothesize that mature human speakers of a native language know a Tarski-style truth-theory that generates statements of
truth-conditions for each declarative sentence. Such theorists are neoDavidsonians in that they are cognitivists: whereas Davidson merely
claimed that knowledge of such a theory would enable speakers to understand a language, these theorists hypothesize that we do know such
theories and that this knowledge is in part causally responsible for our
linguistic behavior. As empirical hypotheses, such claims concerning
semantic competence—whether of the specifically Davidsonian variety
or some other sort—are subject to investigative fortune; and not everyone is sanguine. But my discussion shall proceed from the assumption
that there is something to them: we have here an on-going research
program whose progress has so far been sufficiently successful to warrant exploration of the consequences should it continue to pan out.14
Compositionality imposes a considerable constraint. So does the
need to mesh with a wide range of other hypotheses and data,
including—but by no means limited to—hypotheses concerning the
representation of the syntactic structure to which semantic values are
assigned. As is often remarked, the resulting semantic theories seem
Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge
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not to possess the properties I singled out above in discussing rationalizing semantic knowledge: it seems that the semantic claims such
theories generate often cannot be characterized homophonically, do
require 3 rd -person evidence in order to be self-ascribed, and are not
consciously accessible.
Consider, to begin with, even this extremely elementary semantic
theory for an extremely elementary fragment of English (adapted from
Larson and Segal, 1995, p. 148).15
Lexical Axioms
(1) a. Val(x, Kate) iff x = Kate
b. Val(x, Jill), iff x = Jill
c. Val(<x, y>, knows) iff x knows y
d. Val(x, runs) iff x runs
Phrasal Axioms
(2) a. Val(t, [S NP VP]) iff for some x, Val(x, NP) and Val(x, VP)
b. Val(x, [V P V NP]) iff for some y, Val(<x, y>, V) and Val(y,
NP)
c. Val(x, [Y Z]) iff Val (x, Z), where Y and Z are any nodes
Production Rules
(UI) Universal Instantiation
For any x, F(x)
F(α)
(SE) Substitution of equivalents
F(α)
αiffβ
F(β)
(SI) Substitution of identicals
φiff F(α) and α = β
φiff F(β)

With knowledge of these axioms, using these production schemata,
we can generate the claim, for example, that
(3) Val(t, [S [N P [N Jill]] [V P [V knows] [N P [N Kate]]]]) iff

Knowledge of Meaning, Conscious and Unconscious
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Such a theory seems not to be consciously accessible—at least as
judged by some common marks. (These will suffice for our present purpose: providing prima facie reason to think the two kinds of semantic
knowledge differ. I make a few further remarks below.) To begin with,
the theory deploys concepts typical speakers arguably do not possess—
for example, the syntactic concepts needed to characterize the structures to which semantic values are assigned.17 Moreover, its theorems
are inferentially encapsulated: one’s knowledge of (2.c), for example,
seems for the most part to combine inferentially only with other bits of
one’s semantic knowledge, not with one’s propositional attitudes more
generally. An aspect of this is that this knowledge seems to some extent cognitively impenetrable-that is, unaffected by (the rest of) our
reasoning.18 For example, changing one’s mind about the proper semantic treatment of some phenomenon, say as one takes successive
semantics seminars from linguists with competing views, in no way affects one’s linguistic behavior. Those who explain linguistic behavior by
positing knowledge of a compositional semantic theory must therefore
also say that these changes of mind do not affect the causally responsible semantic knowledge. This provides reason to think that in learning
a semantic theory in a linguistics class or from a textbook—even if
the theory happens to be correct—one is not “bringing to consciousness” the semantic knowledge causally responsible for one’s linguistic
behavior. If the theory happens to be correct, one is merely coming
to represent it in a second way. (Cf. (Stich 1978, pp. 508-9), albeit
regarding syntax.)
Relatedly, self-ascribing a particular compositional semantic theory
requires 3 rd -person evidence. To be sure, much semantic research,
as is the case elsewhere in linguistics, relies on speakers’ 1st-person
judgments—for example, concerning semantic anomaly, the availability of readings, entailment, etc. The theoretical assumption is that such
judgments themselves reflect the exercise of speakers’ semantic competence (their knowledge of a compositional semantic theory), together
with the exercise of their other linguistic and cognitive competencies.
But 1st-person judgments are just one source of data, a source that
can be overridden. It’s not assumed, for example, that it is always
easy for speakers to tease apart semantic and pragmatic contributions
to communicated content.19 Moreover, 1st -person judgments can fall

Jill knows Kate.16
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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short in discriminating purely semantic theories that agree in the 1st person judgments they predict. Ludlow, for example, favors an account
of tense that yields theorems such as
(4) Val(t, [S Smith swam yesterday]) iff
{[I P Smith swims]} was true when {[I P something contextually given]} was true yesterday
(curly brackets indicate Interpreted Logical Forms)

over more standard accounts that yield
(5) Val(t, [S Smith swam yesterday]) iff
for some e, S (the time of utterance) is later than R/E, e
culminates at E, e is a swimming by Smith, R is the day
before S, e occurs at E, and Smith is the agent of e.

Recognizing that 1st -person judgments alone may not settle the matter,
he turns to suggestive data concerning acquisition and acquired deficits
that might lend support to his view. But such data are only available
from a 3 rd -person perspective.20
What of homophony? Arguably, even the toy fragment displays
non-homophony: the lexical axioms introduce talk of identity, and
the derived T-sentence says, not that ‘Jill knows Kate’ is true iff Jill
knows Kate, but that the labeled syntactic structure [S [N P [N Jill]]
[V P [V knows] [N P [N Kate]]]] is. Ludlow’s favored treatment of
tense provides a perhaps clearer example, as its statement of truth
conditions refers to the Interpreted Logical Form of the contextually
given sentence. (Some more examples come up below.) Moreover,
it’s claimed that knowledge of compositional semantic theories in part
explains our ability to assign phonologically (or orthographically) identical expressions distinct meanings—that is, to recognize ambiguities.
Non-homophony would seem essential to this explanation. Again, it’s
claimed that knowledge of compositional semantic theories in part explains at least certain judgments of validity. Some standard strategies
crucially involve departures from homophony, as with the well-known
Davidsonian eventish analysis of adverbial modification. (Davidson
(1967). Cf. below.) It would thus seem, according to cognitivist accounts of semantic competence, that homophonic semantic claims cannot in general capture the specific content of the semantic knowledge
causally implicated in our linguistic behavior.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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In sum, our knowledge of compositional semantic theories would
seem to exhibit none of the three marks exhibited by the sort of rationalizing semantic knowledge expressed by X to SUB. Now, as is well
known, some jib at calling such states knowledge or belief at all—in part
because they exhibit just such features (non-homophony excluded).
But that’s not my point. Call it tacit knowledge or belief—or, adapting
Chomsky, use ‘cognition’ to stand for the relation in which the speaker
stands to such claims.21 To take the cognitivist project at face value is
to grant these states at least a causal role in linguistic behavior, however our relation to them is characterized.22 We’ve seen, however, that
they seem to differ in kind from X’s rationalizing semantic knowledge.
And this leads to my question.
3. WHAT’S THE RELATION?

Let’s be sure that no one thinks I’m trying to motivate a contradiction:
that semantic knowledge is both homophonically characterizable and
not homophonically characterizable; both warrantedly ascribable without reliance on 3 rd -person evidence and only warrantedly ascribable by
adverting to 3 rd -person evidence; and both consciously accessible and
consciously inaccessible. I haven’t said anything that would motivate
such claims as made of one and the same bit of semantic knowledge;
and there’s no contradiction in saying that some semantic knowledge
has these features, but some doesn’t.
Nor is it obvious that there’s some other sort of tension involved in
ascribing both sorts of knowledge a central role in linguistic behavior. One might wonder whether explanations adverting to the one
might threaten to exclude explanations adverting to the other, as it’s
argued that physical explanations threaten to exclude intentional explanations of behavior generally. But, whatever the merits of the standard causal/explanatory exclusion arguments, they would not seem to
translate to our case (even assuming reasons are causes). Our case involves two kinds of intentional state, so there’s no plausible analogue to
the causal closure of the physical relied upon in the standard versions.
In addition, it’s not clear why overdetermination would be problematic
in our case.23
There needn’t be in this sense a problem, however, for us to find
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pressing the question: how are these various bits of semantic knowledge related, if at all? Absent some compelling answer, the apparent difference in kind threatens to thwart our unificatory aspirations.
The rest of this paper distinguishes and outlines various replies and
their varying empirical and philosophical commitments. In this section, I canvass six replies that would claim that the relation is in fact
fairly “intimate.” The first three are variations on the suggestion that
rationalizing semantic knowledge is derived from tacit knowledge of
compositional semantic theory. The fourth challenges the semantic hypotheses that underwrite the “relation” question. The fifth adverts to
a constraint on successful semantic theorizing that would guarantee
identity of content across the two kinds of semantic knowledge. The
sixth maintains (through several variations) that we are in fact talking
about the very same states—only characterized differently. (Replies
two through six build on a reduction of the question effected by the
first reply. Otherwise, I treat these replies individually. Another strategy would be to combine some of them in an attempt to divide-andconquer.) Some may find the various commitments too onerous. In
the subsequent section, I conclude by discussing some less “intimate”
relations that may nonetheless obtain.
Sketching these replies requires touching upon such large topics as content-individuation, attitude-ascriptions, nominalistic reconstrual, etc. Of necessity the discussion will be incomplete. The aim is
just to distinguish the basic options and their differing burdens.
3.1.

Inner workings vs. output

If compositional semantic theories were very simple, one might complain that I’ve overstated the range of inaccessibility. Sure, speakers
typically don’t consciously know (and can’t bring to consciousness) such
knowledge as that:
(2.c) Val(x, [Y Z]) iff Val (x, Z), where Y and Z are any nodes.

And this is something they can warrantedly self-ascribe only on the basis of 3 rd -person evidence. But they can consciously know some of the
knowledge captured in the semantic theory. In particular, they can consciously know the theorems that assign truth-conditions (or meaning)
to sentences. For example, they can consciously know such claims as

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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that:
(6) The sentence ‘Jill knows Kate’ is true if and only if Jill knows
Kate.

And this is the kind of belief that can rationalize linguistic behavior. So,
the relation between these two kinds of knowledge is fairly straightforward after all. For they do coincide in part: although the inner workings of the semantics module (if you will) are inaccessible to consciousness, at least its final output (the assignment of meaning) is accessible
to consciousness and to further reasoning; it is thus poised to play a
rationalizing role with respect to action.
This is clearly too simple as it stands. To begin with, as we’ve seen,
the semantic theory assigns truth-conditions, not to ‘Jill knows Kate,’
but to the labeled syntactic tree [S [N P [N Jill]] [V P [V knows] [N P
[N Kate]]]]. However, there is an obvious reply to this first worry:
it’s part of the speaker’s broader linguistic competence that this syntactic representation is associated with a phonological representation and
(if she’s literate) with an orthographic representation. Drawing upon
this further linguistic (albeit extra-semantic) tacit knowledge, her tacit
knowledge of
(7) Val(t, [S [N P [N Jill]] [V P [V knows] [N P [N Kate]]]]) iff Jill
knows Kate

can yield consciously accessible knowledge of (6). What’s needed
is just a little more processing beyond what the semantic theory delivers.24
But this by itself won’t suffice either, because the problem is not just
the syntactic concepts deployed by the semantic theory. Take, for example, quantified sentences. In the standard set-theoretic formulation
of Generalized Quantifier Theory, cast truth-theoretically, the lexical
axiom for ‘every’ is:
(8) Val(<X, Y>, every, σ) iff |Y-X|= 0

yielding such T-theorems as:
(9) Val(t, [S Every person ponders], σ) iff |y: y is a person - x: x
ponders|= 0.25

Again, tacit extra-semantic knowledge might enable us to relate the assignment of truth-conditions to a consciously accessible representation
of the sentence, yielding:
Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge
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(10) ‘Every person ponders’ is true iff |y: y is a person - x: x
ponders|= 0.

But there remains the right-hand side: the statement of truthconditions deploys concepts not apparent in the target sentence—in
this case, concepts concerning sets and their cardinalities. And these
claims about sets, their cardinalities, and their relations to the truthconditions of mundane sentences arguably can’t be brought to consciousness by typical speakers. Distinguishing the inner workings of
the semantics module and its outputs (and adverting to extra-semantic
knowledge) might reduce the distance between knowledge of a compositional semantic theory and rationalizing semantic knowledge. But a
substantial distance appears to remain between their respective righthand-sides. (10) at least certainly seems to differ from:
(11) ‘Every person ponders’ is true iff every person ponders.

Knowledge of Meaning, Conscious and Unconscious

required. (Cf. Johnson (2007).) This difference alone would suffice to
raise the "relation" question.
3.3.

More processing

But even if speakers don’t possess set-theoretic concepts, the answer
to our question may already lie ready to hand. Perhaps we need only
recycle the maneuver used in response to the presence of syntactic representations: add more processing.26 Larson and Segal (1995, p. 278,
numbering altered), for instance, note that, with some extra-semantic
knowledge, one can derive from (10) something close to being homophonically characterizable. This would also restore accessibility to
consciousness. One need only assume speakers (tacitly) know some set
theory:
(12) a. |Y-X|= 0 iff Y is a subset of X,

How might one handle this?

b. Y is a subset of X iff every element of Y is an element of
X,

3.2.

c. x is an element of x: x is a person iff x is a person, and

Allow conceptual sophistication

One might suggest that typical speakers in fact do possess set-theoretic
concepts (similarly for other seemingly sophisticated concepts semantic
theories deploy), so that at least this mark of difference is eliminated.
Perhaps, then, the derivations described above suffice to relate tacit
knowledge of a semantic theory to potentially rationalizing semantic
knowledge.
Assessing the ascription of set-theoretic concepts requires a developed account of concept-possession. (Lack of set-theoretic vocabulary
is irrelevant: lots of concepts are unlexicalized. Might speakers’ sensitivity to the truth-conditional differences encoded by semantic hypotheses itself supply grounds for ascription?) But we needn’t pursue
this issue here. Whatever its prospects, the suggestion would not suffice to address our question. First, consciously inaccessible knowledge
(as marked, say, by cognitive impenetrability) can be composed of concepts possessed by the subject. Moreover, even if one could challenge
the claim of inaccessibility, there would remain at least an apparent
difference in degree of accessibility between (10) and (11). Beliefs,
including semantic beliefs, can differ in the amount of “priming” necessary for them to become conscious: sometimes significant priming is
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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d. x is an element of x: x ponders iff x ponders.

Then given (10), one can derive:
(13) ‘Every person ponders’ is true iff, for every x such that x is a
person, x ponders.

One can similarly handle all quantified sentences.27
Now we seem to have a general recipe for addressing our question. Though it was too simple to suggest that the semantic theory
itself generates the sort of consciously accessible semantic knowledge
X used to rationalize her linguistic behavior, it may be the case that
the semantic theory plus some further non-semantic stuff does. The
commitment of this reply—and thus its challenge—is that one would
need to concoct and empirically support the attribution of such extra
axioms and extra inferential processing for a wide range of disparate
sentences. For non-homophony and the deployment of concepts not
obviously possessed by typical speakers is the rule, not the exception, in extant semantic theories. Consider Tarski’s famous ‘Snow is
white.’ This sentence contains a mass term and expresses a generic
claim. The proper semantic treatment of both is hotly disputed. But
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whatever the sentence’s semantics turns out to be, it’s doubtful its Ttheorem will be homophonic. For example, one treatment of just its
generic aspect would yield that the sentence is true iff, for all the ways
w things could have been that are within the contextually restricted
modal base and are “most normal,” all snow in w is white.28 Now,
no doubt one could always construct some inferential machinery that,
from this, yields “‘Snow is white” is true iff snow is white’—similarly for
the other non-homophonic, conceptually sophisticated truth-conditions
that empirical constraints force upon a compositional account of semantic competence. But it’s a further question whether one could render the ascription of all this extra machinery empirically compelling.
Absent independent empirical grounds, one would be simply placing a
large empirical bet. The ‘more processing’ reply thus takes on a substantial empirical commitment.
Of course, a large empirical bet is already placed in maintaining
that speaker’s cognize a Davidsonian truth-theory. But this is a bet that
is backed by at least some evidence (albeit in an area rife with disagreement): constructions successfully handled compositionally, subjects’ judgments explained, mesh with neighboring hypotheses, etc.
The point here is that one commits oneself to a large further bet, in advance of any independent grounds, if one answers the “relation” question along these lines. This does not show that the answer is wrong;
but it brings out its distinctive burden.
3.4.

Replace the conceptually sophisticated semantic hypotheses

A generalizability question arises as well for another reply—a reply that
would challenge the specific semantic hypotheses that yield (10) (similarly for other cases that generate the “relation” question). It would
not suffice simply to reject the semantic hypotheses: we are only concerning ourselves with replies that take extant and on-going semantic
theorizing of this sort seriously. The challenge must offer plausible
alternatives—in the case of (10), alternative axioms for quantifiers or
at least an alternative formulation that reveals set-theoretic concepts to
be inessential artifacts of familiar presentations of Generalized Quantifier Theory. Here one might advert to treatments of quantification that
dispense with sets in favor of plural variables. Pietroski (2005), for
example, develops such a view as part of a larger argument for a “conwww.thebalticyearbook.org
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junctivist” eventish semantics, according to which syntactic concatenation always expresses conjunction (a generalization of Davidson’s
treatment of adverbial modification as conjoining information about
an event). Simplifying, Pietroski’s approach yields the following assignment of truth-conditions for ‘Every person ponders’:
(14) Val(t, [S Every person ponders], σ) iff
there are some Os such that:
• all the external participants of the Os are the value t,
• the internal participants of the Os are all and only the
persons, and
• the external participant of an O is t iff the internal participant
of that O ponders.

The eventish complications might seem a distraction from the issue
at hand—whether the semantics of quantifiers requires set-theoretic
concepts. But in fact they are to the point. For a reply to the “relation”
question, again, cannot rest content with having dealt with but one
kind of case; it must generalize. Pietroski’s semantics, while avoiding
set-theoretic concepts, adverts to the technical concept of a participant.
Internal and external participants, in the case of at least some events
(e.g., Mary’s shoving Bill) correspond to the Theme and the Agent of
the event, respectively (the shovee and the shover). Restricting ourselves just to these cases, the concepts might not seem particularly
sophisticated. But in fact they are already fairly technical: an eight
ball can be the Agent of a hitting of the white ball, though it exhibits
no agency; and a song can be the Theme of a performing, although
it’s arguably not affected by the Agent. Moreover, Agent and Theme
are just the most intuitive subspecies of external and internal participants. On Pietroski’s view, truth-values are the internal and external
participants of sentential disjunctions, and they are the external participants of the Os adverted to in the semantics of determiners (as in
the example above). Typical speakers would not seem to possess the
concept of a genus that has Agents and truth-values as subspecies. And
there is more. A less simplified statement of ‘Every person ponders’s
truth-conditions must accommodate its habitual aspect: on the relevant reading, the sentence is about what people tend to do from time
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to time under certain conditions, not what all (or all contextually relevant) people are doing now. As with generics, this arguably requires
the introduction of ways things could be (perhaps possible worlds)
and restricted modal bases.29 Thus, even sticking with our sample sentence, there remains conceptual sophistication apparently separating
(11) and the corresponding right-hand-side that semantic theorizing
yields. No doubt one could generate the “relation” question in other
ways with other sentences as well. We thus have the suggestion of a
general strategy combined again with a substantial burden: showing
that it does indeed generalize beyond the particular case.
Now, the philosophical literature contains many strategies for replacing or analyzing away concepts (in particular those that apparently give rise to problematic ontological commitments). To each, there
might correspond an alternative formulation of semantic hypotheses.
We cannot consider them all. But we may offer three general remarks
and an illustration. First, a reply to the “relation” question that adverts
to some such proposal incurs whatever substantial philosophical commitments the defense of the proposal incurs. Second, the “relation”
question may remain even after the replacement or analysis is applied
to the concepts deployed in hypothesized tacit semantic knowledge:
showing that it did not would be a further commitment. To illustrate,
consider modal structuralism, according to which reference to sets can
be replaced by or analyzed in terms of what’s mathematically necessary, given some mathematically possible axioms. Roughly, the sentence ‘e is an element of set S,’ for example, would be replaced by
or analyzed into ‘It’s mathematically possible that such-and-such settheoretic axioms obtain, and it’s mathematically necessary that, if they
do, then e is an element of set S.’ (Cf. Hellman (1989).) Adverting to
modal structuralism in answering the “relation” question would clearly
involve a substantial philosophic commitment. But, beyond that, we
would seem no further along in specifying the relation between (11)
and what would result for (10). Finally, third, it’s worth noting that,
whether or not the strategy’s burden could be shouldered, extant semantic practice is typically not driven by such conceptual and ontological constraints.30
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“Interpretiveness” requires same content

It is natural at this point to wonder why, if the semantic theory itself states what expressions mean, one would need to appeal to any
other notion of “analysis” in order to establish an intimate relation between (10) and (11)—similarly for other cases. The thought would
run as follows: It’s inconsistent with (10)’s being an “interpretive” Ttheorem—one that “gives” the meaning of the target sentence—that
(10) and (11) differ in content. For if (10) and (11) differ in content,
then surely their right-hand-sides differ in content: what else could be
the source of the difference between (10) and (11)? But that’s just to
say that
(15) |y: y is a person - x: x ponders|= 0

differs in content from
(16) Every person ponders

—that is, that (10) is not interpretive. Now, we can’t deny that (10)
is interpretive if we are taking the deliverances of semantic theorizing
at face value. So, (10) and (11) agree in content. Thus, whether one
focuses on language use as rational activity or as the causal product of
a cognized semantic theory, one ascribes the same semantic knowledge
in the end after all.
This line of thought, however, does not suffice to answer the “relation” question. First, it assumes that the deliverances of the compositional semantic theory must preserve content. But whatever the aims
and claims of other semantic projects, it’s not clear that this is required
by a cognitivist account of semantic competence. It may be, for example,
that subpersonal processing is well-served by the assignment of natural
language sentences to representations that presuppose entities that the
sentences neither explicitly mention nor presuppose. Consider the various semantic treatments that stem from Davidson’s “eventish” analysis
of adverbs mentioned above. It has proven most fruitful to treat various constructions as involving quantification over and predication with
respect to events. Conjoining such predications, for example, readily
explains speakers’ entailment judgments as instances of Conjunction
Reduction.31 But does it really matter to this explanation and, more
generally, does it really matter so far as providing a successful account

Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge

21

Steven Gross

of semantic competence is concerned, whether such sentences—the target sentences—in fact assert the existence of events? I have argued
elsewhere that it seems that nothing is lost if it’s claimed rather that
speakers subpersonally represent the sentences as if they make such
existence claims. More generally, one might hold that, subpersonally,
there is an agnostic pragmatic presupposition that there are events, sets,
possible worlds, what have you—a presupposition that proves computationally useful. The assignment of truth-conditions by the cognized
semantic theory thus needn’t even be true (if, say, it turns out that sets
don’t exist). As far as the requirements of explaining linguistic behavior go, it might suffice that T-theorems like (10) assign truth-conditions
that are at least cognitively equivalent to their target sentences relative
to a presupposition.32
That said, the assumption that truth-theories must preserve content
is widely held. But there is a second reason this line of thought does not
suffice to answer the “relation” question: identity of content does not
entail identity of states. Indeed, we have already noted how cognitive
impenetrability might suggest that one can come to represent the same
semantic content twice. If someone can change her mind about competing semantic theories (perhaps from a standard account of tense to
Ludlow’s) without affecting her linguistic behavior, then the cognitive
states that underlie linguistic behavior would seem to differ from those
that underlie her conscious semantic theorizing. Thus, even with identity of content, there would remain the question of what relation these
two content-identical states bear to one another.
3.6.

Same state characterized two ways

But that we might have identity of content without identity of states
in some cases does not preclude the possibility of an identity of state
between knowledge of (10) and (11). Potentially rationalizing semantic beliefs like (11) are stable—unlike semantic beliefs acquired in a
semantics class. The argument from cognitive impenetrability to difference in states thus lacks a foothold here, since it requires some variability to which linguistic behavior is impervious.
Thus, it remains possible to answer the “relation” question by claiming that (10) and (11)—similarly for other cases—characterize one and
the same state of the speaker, albeit in different ways. According to
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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this reply, there is after all an overlap between the empirically posited
semantic knowledge and the knowledge speakers can articulate in rationalizing their linguistic behavior. Indeed, it turns out that speakers
can homophonically characterize at least some of the states generated
by the cognized compositional semantic theory, they don’t require 3 rd person evidence to self-ascribe these states, and they can bring them
to consciousness. It’s just that they can do so only under a particular
characterization. To conclude that there must be distinct mental states
would be illicitly to transfer features of the characterizations to the
states themselves. One would commit the same fallacy identity theorists object to when they’re presented with the argument that visual
experiences can’t be brain states because I’m conscious of the one, but
not the other.
The analogy here is not exact, however. When it’s debated whether
visual experiences could be identical with brain states, we are not dealing with two characterizations both of which ascribe content. When
we are dealing with multiple intentional characterizations, there is the
possibility of denying identity of state by denying identity of content.
There is thus room to resist the current proposal if there is reason to
deny that (10) and (11) agree in content, assuming that a difference
in content suffices for a difference in characterized state. Now, we
have already noted the possibility that “interpretive” T-theorems need
not preserve content, which would allow (10) and (11) to differ in
content. But even if one demurs at this controversial suggestion and
maintains that “interpretiveness” requires identity of content, there remains room for content-based resistance. For one might suggest that
the conception of content-individuation relevant to the “interpretiveness” constraint is coarser than the criterion relevant to individuating
mental states.
Consider the following version of a criterion advanced by Frege:
Frege-Criterion: If someone who understands both claims
can rationally believe that A and not believe that B, then ‘A’
and ‘B’ differ in content.33
Suppose, moreover, that, if S believes that A and believes that B,
and if ‘A’ and ‘B’ differ in content, then the beliefs differ in content—
similarly for other attitudes. (Call this the Ascription Thesis.) A
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nominalist—in particular, someone who denies the existence of sets—
might believe (11) without believing (10). His nominalism may be
wrong, but it’s another thing to declare him irrational. If he’s not irrational, then, given the Frege-Criterion, even non-nominalists must
accept that (10) and (11) differ in content. From the Ascription Thesis, it then follows that speakers’ attitudes characterized by (10) and
(11) differ in content. Finally, if a difference in content suffices for a
difference in state, it follows that (10) and (11) do not characterize the
same state in different ways.34
There are various responses to this argument, besides declaring
the nominalist irrational. Each amounts to a distinct development of
the ‘one state, two characterizations’ answer to the “relation” question.
One might deny
• the satisfaction of the Frege-Criterion’s antecedent in this case
• the satisfaction of the Ascription Thesis’ antecedent in this case
• the Ascription Thesis
• the assumption that identity of state requires identity of content
• or of course the Frege-Criterion.
The details would vary with one’s conception of contentindividuation and attitude-ascription. Covering all the options is beyond our scope, but we can record some salient considerations. After
briefer discussions of the first four moves, we’ll spill more ink on the
rejection of the Frege-Criterion.
1. deny satisfaction of Frege-Criterion’s antecedent
How might one challenge the particular application of the FregeCriterion? First, one might suggest that the nominalist fails to understand ‘A’ and/or ‘B’ (e.g., fails to understand (10) and/or (11)). It’s
hard to see, however, what grounds one could advance for this, save
the nominalist’s very failure to treat ‘A’ and ‘B’ as epistemically equivalent. But this would require a standard for understanding that’s divorced from ordinary assessments (a standard, what’s more, so high as
to render the criterion useless in settling disputed cases). Absent some
independent motivation, this response begs the question.
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Second, one might deny that a nominalist who understands both
and accepts (11) does not believe (10)—even if he does not assent
when asked. This bullet-biting commitment would require as well a
pragmatic explanation of why we typically would not ascribe such a
belief, even though the ascription would be true. (Cf. Soames (1987).)
In addition, there is a threat that such a position must deny that it’s
rationally possible to be a nominalist, if to be a nominalist just is to
believe that there don’t exist abstract objects such as sets. For, if the
nominalist believes that every person ponders (or, it would seem, any
other quantified claim), then he believes, on this view, its set-theoretic
equivalent and is thus committed to the existence of sets and thus to
something inconsistent with the belief that sets don’t exist. Perhaps
some would welcome this conclusion: the nominalist is irrational after
all. Alternatively, to avoid this threat, one might reconceive what it is to
be a nominalist: perhaps a nominalist is someone who understands but
does not accept the sentence ‘Abstract objects exist’ (or some translation
thereof).
2. deny satisfaction of Ascription Thesis’ antecedent
How might one challenge the particular application of the Ascription Thesis? When one utters ‘A believes that P,’ the speech act content
can be accurate even though the sentence uttered is false—and, even
if the sentence is not false, it may ascribe a different content than the
speech act. There is thus the possibility that utterances of attitudeascribing sentences that embed (10) and (11) express truths, although
not by ascribing the contents that (10) and (11) express. If so, the
antecedent of the Ascription Thesis may not be satisfied. The objection is thus that the argument falsely assumes that, if what a speaker
communicates in uttering ‘S believes that P’ is true, then S believes that
P.
But, while this assumption does not hold generally, we are dealing
in our case, on the one hand, with an ascription entered in a theoretical context (the ascription of a cognized semantic theory), and, on the
other, with an ascription of what the speaker herself can avow in any
context using the sentence in the ascription’s that-clause (the ascription of rationalizing semantic knowledge). It therefore seems that the
possibility of interfering pragmatic factors is not relevant here. It’s reasonable to assume that, not only our ascriptions, but also the ascribing

Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge

25

Steven Gross

sentences are accurate.
3. deny Ascription Thesis
The Ascription Thesis follows from a more basic principle—viz.,
that “belief reports specify belief contents, i.e., to be true a belief report
must specify a proposition the person believes.” (Bach (1997), p. 222)
Kent Bach (1997) rejects this “Specification Assumption” in favor of the
view that belief reports merely describe or characterize what a person
believes. Bach’s argument in large part is that his view best handles the
semantic and pragmatic effects of proper names in attitude contexts—
in particular, in Kripke’s Paderewski case.35 Someone adverting to Bach
in challenging this basis for the Ascription Thesis thus commits herself
to a particular position on much-disputed questions concerning attitude ascriptions. But even if one grants the attractions of Bach’s view,
there is a question whether adopting it would threaten the use of the
Ascription Thesis above.
Bach’s positive proposal is that an utterance of ‘S believes that P’
is true iff S believes a certain thing (made relevant in that context, in
part owing to the sentence uttered) that entails and is an elaboration of
the proposition that P.36 An utterance of ‘Peter believes that Paderewski
has musical talent,’ for example, may be true on one occasion but false
on another, because the “certain thing” may differ: on one occasion, it
may be more fully described using ‘Paderewski, the pianist, has musical
talent;’ on the other, by ‘Paderewski, the statesman, has musical talent.’
These sentences express elaborations of and entail the proposition that
Paderewski has musical talent. They more fully describe the relevant
“certain thing,” even though they themselves may not fully specify the
belief’s content either. (In fact, Bach doubts that a that-clause can give
a complete description—a specification—of a belief’s content.)
To reject the Specification Assumption is to reject one basis for the
Ascription Thesis. This rejection does not per se entail that the Ascription Thesis is false. But Bach’s view of belief ascriptions does entail the
rejection of Ascription Thesis as well. For on his view it’s possible for
utterances of ‘S believes that John is nice’ and ‘S believes that John,
the barber, is nice’ to both be true and to be true in virtue of the same
“certain thing” believed by S, even though ‘John is nice’ and ‘John, the
barber, is nice’ differ in content.
The question now is whether Bach’s reasons for rejecting the Spec-
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ification Assumption are germane to us. Bach focuses on utterances
involving proper names. Can one generalize his considerations to encompass sentences like (10) and (11)? In particular, is it possible that
ascriptions using (10) and (11) might concern the same state, even
if (10) and (11) themselves differ in content? To address this question, one needs inter alia a better understanding of what counts as an
“elaboration;” otherwise, one cannot assess whether there might be a
content that is an elaboration both of what (10) expresses and of what
(11) expresses. Bach’s discussion does not include an account of elaboration, but rather proceeds by example. (Cf. Soames (forthcoming), on
proper pragmatic enrichment.) His examples all involve the addition
of descriptive material to the ascription’s that-clause. But it is unobvious what additions one might make to (10) and (11)—short of conjoining each to the other—that would yield a content satisfying Bach’s
conditions. If one cannot extend Bach’s discussion to our cases, then,
even if the Ascription Thesis is false as a general principle, it may be
a permissible idealization—one that brackets orthogonal concerns—as
deployed above.
4. one state, two contents
Perhaps one might reject the assumption that a difference in content suffices for a difference in characterized state: why not allow
one state to bear multiple contents? (10) and (11) could thus differ in content, and yet accurately specify the content of the same
state—or rather, though neither would specify the content of the state,
each would at least specify one of the state’s contents. Such a view
clearly requires motivation and development. I will only mention three
challenges it would face. First, allowing states to bear multiple contents complexifies the question of how a state, in virtue of its content, plays its causal and/or rationalizing roles. On the computationalrepresentational theory of mind, for example, a state’s “syntax” mirrors
its content. But if a state has multiple contents, which content is syntactically mirrored? And if only one can be, how does one account for
the other contents’ causal-rationalizing roles? If these questions cannot be satisfactorily answered, then this move requires a rejection of
the computational-representational theory of mind. Second, allowing
states to bear multiple contents complexifies the question of how, or in
virtue of what, states have the contents they do. It has proven difficult

Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge

27

Steven Gross

enough to answer this question on the assumption that content-bearing
states bear only one content. It’s unclear, to say the least, how extant
strategies could be developed to handle multiple contents. Third, one
would want an explanation of why there are states bearing multiple
contents, and why states bear those contents together.
5. reject Frege-Criterion
Finally, one might of course reject the Frege-Criterion. I limit myself
to three remarks.
a. First, this move is not available to those neo-Davidsonians who
have explicitly committed themselves to the Frege-Criterion. (Cf. Segal
(2003), but also Brown (2003) in reply.) The cognitivist account itself,
however, does not seem so committed; and those neo-Davidsonians
might be willing to change their minds.
b. Second, one might find oneself committed to a very coarse conception of content indeed. At least on the surface, (10) and (11)’s
right-hand-sides (i.e., (15) and (16)) seem to differ significantly in
their structure—as do, therefore, (10) and (11) themselves. If this
surface difference runs deeper, identifying the contents of (10) and
(11) would preclude endorsing a conception of content-individuation
that requires sameness of structure. This would preclude, for example, neo-Russellian conceptions, according to which contents are, or
are represented by, n-tuples of objects, properties, and relations. The
most natural remaining candidate conception would then seem to be
mere necessary equivalence. While a conception of content with its defenders, this rather coarse conception is certainly controversial, facing
well-known objections (one of which we’ll touch on below).37
To avoid this result, one could try arguing that (10) and (11)—
in particular, their right-hand-sides—don’t differ in structure after all.
This would require an explanation and defense of the relevant conception of structure as applied to the claims at issue. It seems unpromising to suggest that (10) and (11) are syntactically isomorphic.
But one might instead look to the cognized semantic theory itself for
the relevant conception of structure. Suppose, for instance, that a sentence’s structure is given by, or is a function of, the right-hand-side
of its T-theorem. (10) and (11) would then agree in structure if the
right-hand-sides of their T-theorems (note: not the structure of their
own right-hand-sides (15) and (16)) were associated with the same
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structure. That is, if ‘A’ and ‘B’ below were associated with the same
structure:
(17) ‘ ‘Every person ponders’ is true iff |y: y is a person - x: x
ponders|= 0’ is true iff B.
(18) ‘ ‘Every person ponders’ is true iff every person ponders’ is
true iff A.

Because, however, (10) and (11) are identical except for their righthand-sides, it’s natural to assume that any difference in the right-handsides of the T-theorems for (10) and (11) will reflect a difference in
the right-hand-sides of the T-theorems for (10) and (11)’s right-handsides—that is, in the T-theorems for (15) and (16):
(19) ‘|y: y is a person - x: x ponders|= 0’ is true iff ?
(20) ‘Every person ponders’ is true iff ?

Of course, once completed, (20)—the T-theorem for (16)—is just
(10). What of (19), the T-theorem for (15)? What would need to
be shown is that its right-hand-side is associated with the same structure as the right-hand-side of (20)—that is, the right-hand-side of (10),
which is (15) itself. It’s unclear, however, that this could be done.
(15)’s mathematical symbolism arguably abbreviates an existential generalization. So, if the T-theorem concerns what the sentence abbreviates, then, according to Generalized Quantifier Theory, its right-handside will indeed concern the cardinality of a set. But not as with (10).
Rather, the right-hand-side might look something like:
(21) |u: u = 0 - v: v = |y: y is a person - x: x ponders||= 0, and
|v: v = |y: y is a person - x: x ponders||= 1.

If this is right, then (10) and (11) do not have the same structure. If
this is not right, then we are owed an alternative account. I will not
pursue further how this line might be developed, except to note that,
if (19), the T-theorem for (15), is homophonic—if this is the way structural equivalence is achieved—then we risk jumping from the frying
pan into the fire. For, as we’ll now see, preserving structural identity in
this way threatens to leave us without an answer to a further question
proponents of alternative conceptions of content must address.
c. If one rejects the Frege-Criterion, there is the matter of adequately explaining, or explaining away, the apparent difference in cognitive significance that motivates the Criterion in the first place. I’ll
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mention just two strategies of particular relevance to us—the neoRussellian account of Fodor (1990 and 1998), applied to the case at
hand, and the explicitly Stalnakerian account of Dwyer & Pietroski
(1996), who defend a coarse, necessary-equivalence conception of content specifically in application to semantic belief.
i. According to Fodor, what accounts for the difference in cognitive significance marked by the Frege-Criterion is not a difference in
content, but rather a difference in vehicle. His Representational Theory of Mind holds that, for beings like us, to be in a contentful state
is, as a matter of nomological necessity, to stand in some appropriate relationship to a mental representation, a sentence-like particular
in the Language of Thought (Mentalese). This mental representation
(token-identical to a brain-state) would be the vehicle of content. But
differently typed vehicles can bear the same content—thus the strategy
of explaining differences in cognitive significance by appeal to differences in vehicle.
While Fodor does not himself advocate a cognitivist truth-theoretic
account of semantic competence, some such advocates have found it
natural to develop their accounts within the framework of Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind. Thus they hold that the cognized semantic theory is represented in the Language of Thought.38 On such a
view, the cognized semantic theory functions as an interface between
natural language sentences and sentences in Mentalese—translating,
as it were, between one and the other.39 (10), although expressed in
English, is thus supposed to capture relevant aspects of how the Tsentence for ‘Every person ponders’ is represented in Mentalese: (15),
the cardinality claim on (10)’s right-hand-side, is thus the Mentalese
“translation” of ‘Every person ponders.’ (Cf. Kim (1995), pp. 54950.) But then consider (11). (11) is supposed to be an example of a
semantic claim X might use to rationalize her linguistic behavior. But
how would (11)—not just the target sentence it mentions (’Every person ponders’), but (11) itself, the T-sentence—be represented in Mentalese? Given what (10) tells us, it would seem the T-sentence for (11)
would be something like:
(22) Val(t, [S ‘Every person ponders’ is true iff every person ponders]) iff ‘Every person ponders’ is true iff
|y: y is a person - x: x ponders|= 0.
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(22), that is, would be the proper fleshing-out of (17). If we again
ignore some admittedly important complications (concerning how the
semantic theory treats the predicate ‘is true,’ how this predicate is related to the semantic value t, and how the semantic theory treats quotation), we see that (22)’s right-hand-side—that is, the translation of
(11) into Mentalese—is more-or-less (10). This certainly seems to be
good news for the strategy that would maintain that (10) and (11)
characterize the content of one and the same mental state in two ways!
But now we face a problem. If (10) and (11) are represented the
same way in Mentalese—that is, if there is no vehicular difference between them—then one can’t apply Fodor’s account of variation in cognitive significance. We are left without an explanation of how someone
could rationally believe one but not the other. Admittedly, I’ve supplied
but a gesture towards a reason for thinking that (10) and (11) would
receive the same Mentalese representation. But we can heighten the
problem by noting that it’s not clear that a Fodorian is any better placed
to explain variation in cognitive significance if (10) and (11) do not receive the same Mentalese representation. For, if they don’t, then there’s
reason to worry that they differ in structure and so—by Fodor’s lights—
must differ in content after all. This is because, if (10) and (11) do not
differ in structure, then it’s unclear in what their vehicular difference
consists. If not in a difference in structure, then surely it consists in
a difference in atomic constituent concept.40 But it’s unclear what difference in atomic constituent concept there is between (10) and (11)’s
Mentalese representations. Hence, the temptation to posit instead a
difference in structure and thus in Fodorian content. It’s therefore unclear that one can combine a structured conception of content and a
vehicular account of variation in cognitive significance with the claim
that t-sentence pairs like (10) and (11) agree in content. The burden
rests with someone who thinks otherwise.41
Even successfully shouldering this burden, however, would not save
this strategy from a more basic problem. The interest in defending
the claim that (10) and (11) agree in content arises from an interest
in arguing that they characterize the same state in two ways, which
requires identity of content. But identity of content, as we’ve noted, is
not sufficient for sameness of state. The whole idea behind the Fodorian
strategy is to explain variation in cognitive significance by appeal to
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some other difference in state besides a difference in content. The
important point for us is that a difference in vehicle is a difference in
state. So, successfully applying the Fodorian strategy in this case would
hurt rather than help the present reply to the “relation” question.
ii. What of unstructured, coarse conceptions of content? Such
views must also explain, or explain away, the apparent differences in
cognitive significance that motivate the Frege-Criterion. Dwyer & Pietroski (1996) address this issue in the course of developing an account
specifically of semantic belief. On their view, content can be represented by a set of possible worlds; the objects of attitudes are thus
individuated by necessary equivalence. They then explain appearances
to the contrary by offering a semantics for belief-ascription according
to which (roughly) an ascription ‘S believes that p’ is true iff S believes
both the proposition expressed by ‘’p’ and the proposition expressed by
the meta-linguistic sentence ‘ ‘p’ is true.’ (p. 364) The apparent difference in belief is thus explained by a real difference in what ascriptions
assert concerning belief about language.42 That, at least, is how things
go for paradigmatic cases. It is crucial to their view, however, that
ascription of tacit belief—such as belief in a compositional semantic
theory (pp. 367-8)—falls outside the paradigmatic cases. This is because speakers typically would not assent to statements of these beliefs
and therefore the formulation of linguistic generalizations need not be
sensitive to differences in co-referring theoretical terms. (p. 362) They
argue that, as a result, belief ascriptions in such cases need not satisfy the meta-linguistic condition in order to be true. But this raises a
prima facie problem: for now it would seem that their device for explaining our response to Frege-cases is unavailable when dealing with
tacit semantic beliefs.
Dwyer and Pietroski might reply as follows. In ascribing belief in
(11), we are engaged in paradigmatic belief ascription and so do require satisfaction of the meta-linguistic condition for the ascription to
be true. In ascribing belief in (10), we are not engaged in paradigmatic belief ascription and so do not require it. Nonetheless, in each
case, we’ve ascribed a belief with the same content. The apparent difference in belief, granted, is not in this case explained by a difference
in the subject’s beliefs about language. But the approach still has the
resources for explaining the appearance. In this case, it’s explained
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by a difference in the kind of belief-ascription in which the ascriber is
engaged (paradigmatic versus non-paradigmatic).
This reply, however, arguably succeeds too well. For in shifting
the locus of the explanation to the ascriber, we seem committed to
a view on which there’s little, if anything, to distinguish the nature
of the states—in particular, the subject’s relation to them. Regardless
of whether the intentional states posited in cognitivist explanations
are called beliefs or not (as opposed to cognitions or what have you),
there’s a natural thought that they often differ in significant, characteristic ways from paradigmatic beliefs—viz., in just the ways we’ve
been emphasizing throughout. But, on the Dwyer-Pietroski view, these
differences—for example, in accessibility to consciousness—don’t actually reflect differences in subjects’ mental states; they reflect differences
located in the practices of ascribers.43
Raised as a worry, this might seem question-begging: isn’t the purpose of the present section to consider the suggestion that claims like
(10) and (11) might characterize one and the same state characterized
in two different ways? Yes, but my current point is not that it’s per
se problematic to say that differences in cognitive significance do not
reflect differences in mental state. My point, rather, is to draw out the
potential consequences of this suggestion—viz., that it might commit
one, not only to a very coarse conception of content with its concomitant account of Frege-cases, but also to this surprising ascriber-based
distinction between explicit and tacit belief. It’s highly unobvious to
say the least that one should accept such consequences.
4. LESS “INTIMATE” RELATIONS

We’ve surveyed a variety of ways one might answer the “relation” question and their varying empirical and philosophical commitments. Suppose it happens that the cards do not favor any of them: suppose that
ascriptions of (10) and (11) do indeed concern distinct states, that the
one cannot be derived from the other, and that neither developments in
nor reinterpretations of semantic theorizing will change this. It would
not follow that rationalizing semantic knowledge and tacit knowledge
of a compositional semantic theory are simply unrelated, but only that
the relations they do bear to one another are somewhat less “intimate.”
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I conclude by briefly indicating what some of these relations are or
might be.
A. Recall our two bases for positing propositional semantic knowledge. According to the first, consideration of language use as rational
activity provides reason to ascribe mature language users with semantic beliefs like (11). According to the second, for beings like us, it’s
nomologically necessary, to be a mature user of a language, that one
cognize a compositional semantic theory for that language. It follows
that, for beings like us, at least in the typical case and ceteris paribus,
we would not possess the rationalizing semantic belief if we did not
cognize a compositional semantic theory.44 So, here’s a first thing we
can say: as a matter of empirical fact (in the normal case), the one
enables the other. This is not yet to say very much, however, since it’s
also true as a matter of nomological necessity that we wouldn’t possess
the rationalizing semantic belief if we didn’t possess a liver.
B. We may add something more specific, though, concerning the
specifically semantic expressions needed to express rationalizing semantic belief—expressions such as ‘means,’ ‘refers,’ ‘is true,’ etc. Expressing any belief in language requires competence with the expressions
used—and so expressing rationalizing semantic beliefs requires competence with semantic expressions. If the cognitivist hypothesis concerning semantic competence is correct, this means in particular that,
in the normal case, the speaker must cognize axioms pertaining to the
semantic terms. Thus, while cognition of the axioms pertaining to the
constituents and syntactic structure of some sentence ‘S’ might in large
part explain our understanding of it, our ability to express propositional knowledge of what ‘S’ means requires something more—in particular, cognition of that part of a semantic theory that concerns semantic vocabulary (not to mention a way of referring to or describing
‘S’).
Now, when the semantic claim is homophonic (say, ‘S’ means that
S), the T-theorem for ‘S’ will indeed play a role in one’s understanding
of, and ability to produce, that claim. But not because the T-theorem’s
right-hand-side will receive further processing, as in the opening answers to the "relation" question. There, it was suggested that one draw
on extra-semantic information to derive a homophonic T-sentence for
‘S’. But the role the T-theorem for ‘S’ plays here is different. The point
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is simply that, since ‘S’ is a constituent of ‘ ‘S’ means that S,’ the Ttheorem for ‘S’ will be drawn upon in deriving the T-theorem for the
more complex sentence that states what ’S’ means.
Thus, we have a second way claims like (10) and (11) are related:
(9), the T-theorem from which (10) is derived (replacing the targetsentence’s syntactic representation) plays a role in the generation of
the T-theorem for (11), which (in the normal case) is necessary for the
expression in that language of the semantic belief (12) characterizes.
Let me underscore, however, that this is a relation between the cognized T-theorem and the homophonic expression of the rationalizing
semantic belief—not a relation between the T-theorem and the rationalizing semantic belief itself.45
C. But the T-theorem might play a role, not just in speakers’ understanding the homophonic rationalizing semantic claim, but also in warranting their belief in what it expresses. This would be so if cognition
of the relevant T-theorem plays a causal, but non-inferential, role in the
generation of the corresponding rationalizing semantic belief.46 Since
these beliefs tend to be true, the mechanism that produces them is
reliable—and so the cognition, insofar as it constituted an element of
this mechanism, would provide part of the rationalizing semantic belief’s entitlement. This etiological (and thus in this case epistemic) role
for cognition of a compositional semantic theory would clearly distinguish it from the mere nomologically necessary enabling status of a
speaker’s liver.47
These three relations are all sufficiently lacking in intimacy that
perhaps one can’t help but think that there are more intimate details
to be learned (even if we’re too young to learn them just yet). In
particular, one wants to know why mature adults possess both kinds of
semantic knowledge, if they do. One might speculate that the cognized
semantic theory is as it is owing to the demands of our subpersonal
cognitive economy, while we possess consciously accessible semantic
knowledge that we may exercise a degree of rational control over our
linguistic activities and explain our actions to others. But this is not the
place to develop or assess this idea.
Of course, it’s also very possible that we will come to see that we
should reject the claim that propositional semantic knowledge plays
a rationalizing role in linguistic behavior or that we should reject the
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claim that we cognize a semantic theory—or that we should reject both
(perhaps even in part on account of their relation being obscure).48
Notes
1
Stanley and Williamson 2001 and Snowden (2003) argue that knowledge-how is
a species of knowledge-that: for X to know how to Y is for there to be a way of Y-ing
such that X knows that it’s a way of Y-ing (under a “practical mode of presentation,” on
Stanley and Williamson’s view). Even if this is right, there would remain the question
whether this kind of knowledge-that exhausts semantic knowledge. (Cf. Hornsby (2005)
p. 117. fn. 17.) Stanley (2005), for example, would answer that it does not. As for
semantic knowledge possibly being something else altogether, cf. (Chomsky 1968/72, p.
191) on the collocation ‘knowledge of language’—for discussion and further references,
see Collins (2004). There is also the distinction between knowledge and belief (see also
below on ‘cognition’), but this will play no significant role in my discussion and I will
sometimes switch from one to the other. Talk of knowledge should be understood as a
convenient shorthand for: knowledge or something knowledge-like.
2
This aspiration, as I conceive it, is metaphysically modest: it’s an expression of a
methodological naturalism that does not presuppose metaphysical naturalism or physicalism. Cf. Gross (2005b).
3
Regarding the claim that issues involving context-sensitivity and pragmatically communicated content are orthogonal to my topic: Empirical theories of semantic competence of the sort I discuss below typically accommodate such phenomena by some combination of (i) indexicality and other parameterizations in the semantics and (ii) post-semantic pragmatic processes. The “relation” question remains, however, when the parameters in (i) are filled in (see fn. 26 below); and, on the views in question, it happens at
least often enough to raise the “relation” question that the saturated semantic content
survives pragmatic processing—i.e., is, or is a part of, what the speaker communicates.
(I do not take lightly, however, the challenge context-sensitivity poses for such semantic
theories—see, e.g., Gross (1998/2001) and Gross (2005c). Other matters I skirt over
include consciously accessible knowledge of semantically relevant structure and of the
meaning of sub-sentential expressions; the proper object of semantic belief/cognition
(I-language vs. idiolect vs. public language); and the proper format of semantic claims
or beliefs (e.g., ‘S means p’, ‘S means that p,’ or ‘S is true iff p’). Concerning the last, I
concessively assume that something formatted in one way can be appropriately related
to something formatted in another—but cf. Gross (2005a).
4
Cf., e.g., (Hornsby 2005, p. 128), (Soames 1989, pp. 587–91), (Fodor 1989, pp.
418–9).
5
(Hornsby 2005, pp. 118-9) maintains that, though “of course no-one will deny
that, in some sense, producing sentences—words in a certain order—is something a
speaker intentionally does,” this is so only insofar as words are "conceived as laden with
meaning." But, she says, a

different conception of words and sentences [viz., as mentioned] is brought
into play by those who tell us that a speaker’s knowledge of the propositions of semantic theories explains what the speaker does.
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This, if correct, would pose no threat to the claims of this section, as far as I can see. But
it could indicate a further difference between the semantic knowledge posited by our
two strategies. However, I will bracket this and related issues concerning how sentences
are conceived and represented. (Cf. below—also (Fodor 2006, p. 42, fn. 12), and Dwyer
and Pietroski, 1996, p. 364.)
A possible consideration against the intentionality claim that Hornsby does not mention is that both speakers and hearers typically remember, even when asked immediately
after the speech act, what was said, but not the exact words used. (Cf. Sachs (1967) and,
for brief discussion and further references, (Johnson 2007, p. 267).) However, while
this is an important datum about our linguistic capacities, it’s not clear that intention-inaction requires that memory perform better.
Finally, for an excellent test-case of intentionality, see Clark & Fox Tree (2002) on the
differing, surprisingly specific informational contents of ’uh’ and ’um.’ Clark and Fox Tree
argue that ’uh’ and ’um’ are conventional English words meaning, roughly, that a minor
delay is coming and that a major delay is coming, respectively. Speakers can control their
use to some extent: radio announcers use them considerably less when on-air. But are
these sounds uttered intentionally in order to communicate this content?!
6
These claims contain a fair number of qualifications. It’s not suggested that language use as such must be rationalized in part by propositional semantic knowledge. No
claim about the concept or essence of linguistic competence is being made; nor even
about what’s nomologically necessary for humans. (The nature of possible non-human
language use is not our concern; nor must we maintain that the picture extends to the
language use of young children or incapacitated adults—though cf. fn. 45 below.) It
suffices for our concerns that this in fact tends to be the case for mature human language users with respect to native languages in which they are competent. And we may
allow plenty of exceptions even among instances of language use by mature competent
humans. One may find oneself blurting out something unintentionally. One may intentionally utter some sentence for no particular reason—unless, perhaps, the presence of
an urge to which one gives in may itself count as one’s reason. One may utter a sentence
to achieve some end, but not because one’s belief that, in doing so, one will achieve that
end is based upon a belief about what the sentence means—as when one utters any old
French sentence in order to sound sexy to a non-French speaker. Still, having granted
all this, one might maintain that the claims apply to typical language use—or at least a
wide range of central cases. And that’s all this section needs. Two further points. Note,
first, that neither that someone X’s in order to Y nor X-ing’s being a way to Y entails that
X-ing is a means to Y or is an indirect way of Y-ing. So, nothing said requires that the relation between uttering a sentence and performing a speech act always be so understood.
Second, note that we nowhere above or below need advert to higher-order or reflexive
Gricean communicative intentions.
7
(Fodor 2006, p. 32) seems already to consider the knowledge that uttering S on this
occasion is a way to assert that P to be propositional semantic knowledge.
8
A clear example of such anti-intellectualism is Dreyfus (2005).
9
For other tacks, see Lepore (1997) and Fodor (2006).
10
These remarks are of course too brief to decisively refute either a general eliminativism or epiphenomenalism about folk psychology or a more specific skepticism concerning, if you will, folk semantics (or this aspect of it). But my aim here is only to motivate
a view, not to establish it conclusively. On our surprising capacity for confabulation, see
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e.g. Nisbett and Wilson’s classic 1977.
11
Of course, bilinguals, unlike monolinguals, have the ability to speak about one language they speak using another. But I have in mind other differences. There is, for
example, some evidence that bilinguals, at least in early stages of development, perform better on certain meta-linguistic tasks, such as Piaget’s sun-moon problem (If we
exchanged the names of the sun and moon, what would the sky look like at night?). Cf.
Bialystok (2001, Chap. 5).
12
I’ve simply adapted the standard way we explain to students the sense in which
homophonic T-sentences are non-trivial. Cf. (Kim 1995, pp. 30-2).
13 r d
3 -person evidence could indeed become relevant to a reassessment of some semantic belief—say, when communicative failure leads one to suspect idiolectical variation.
But then the speaker is assessing the semantic belief itself, not a self-ascription of it.
14
For a textbook presentation, see Kim (1995). I limit myself to neo-Davidsonianism as an expository convenience in part because it’s familiar to philosophers, relatively
easy to set out, and arguably less ontologically committing than other styles of semantic theorizing. Both Davidsonians and Neo-Davidsonians often argue, moreover, that
other approaches fail to be “absolute”—i.e., they fail to yield information knowledge of
which would suffice for understanding the language. Cf. Lepore (1983) and Higginbotham (1988). Much of what I say, however, would apply as well to other cognitivist
propositional accounts of semantic competence. Work in the Montagovian tradition, for
example, is sometimes construed in this way. Cf., e,g., (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet
1995, pp. 404-7) for some discussion.
15
Below I suggest that the theory deploys concepts unfamiliar to most competent speakers. The point is not meant to turn on unfamiliar notation. So, (1.a) says: For all x, x
is a semantic value of ‘Kate’ iff x = Kate (roughly, ‘Kate’ refers to Kate). ‘V,’ ‘NP,’ and
‘VP’ (short for: verb, noun phrase, and verb phrase) name different kinds of nodes on
syntactic trees. (2.a) says: A sentence made up of a noun phrase followed by a verb
phrase is true just in case there’s something that’s a semantic value of each. (2.c) says:
If a node on a syntactic tree has but one daughter node, then the mother node inherits
the semantic value of the daughter node. Etc. Variables above are bound by suppressed
universal quantifiers.
16
I.e., roughly, the syntactic structure associated with ‘Jill knows Kate’ has the semantic
value t (is true) iff Jill knows Kate. Cf. Larson and Segal (1995, pp. 120-1).
17
I am not counting the (subpersonal) presence of a mental representation with the
relevant content as sufficient for possessing the concept in the relevant sense. Otherwise, the possession of tacit semantic knowledge would suffice for possession of these
concepts. (Some cash out the relevant notion of concept-possession by reference to inferential integration. This would collapse the main text’s present point into the next.)
18
Though conscious beliefs can in some ways affect one’s tacit semantic knowledge—as
when one’s lexical entry for ‘fortnight’ changes in response to one’s realization that others
use the term differently.
19
This might seem in tension with the ascription of privileged self-knowledge of rationalizing semantic belief. But it only helps mark its limits.
20
Ludlow (1999). He discusses the further suggestive data on pp. 138-141. (Interpreted Logical Forms are labeled syntactic trees with each node paired with its semantic
value.)
21
Cf. (Chomsky 1975, pp. 164–6). I say “adapt,” however, because Chomsky himself

www.thebalticyearbook.org

Knowledge of Meaning, Conscious and Unconscious

38

(e.g., 2003) disavows intentional readings of ‘cognition’. (Construed non-intentionally—and perhaps even construed as ascription of an attitude distinct from both knowledge and belief—ascription of cognition might be acceptable to those who maintain that
semantic knowledge is practical.)
22
It’s a further question whether such states, since they are consciously inaccessible,
can be reasons for which an agent acts or believes. (For a possible negative answer, see
Heck, 2006, p. 32—though note his use of ‘may’ on p. 31. For a possible affirmative answer, depending on the details of the semantic theory, see Rumfitt, 1995, pp. 858-9, who,
however, allows that this involves idealization—albeit without expanding on its nature.)
It is tempting to argue that conscious accessibility is required if such states are to be subject to rational assessment and control and that this is what distinguishes rational agency
from the merely purposive. But whether one can support such claims without committing oneself to an objectionably strong form of epistemic internalism is not obvious. If
consciously inaccessible states cannot be reasons for which an agent acts or believes,
then there is a further difference between the belief in a compositional semantic theory
and rationalizing semantic belief. If they can, then the belief in a compositional semantic
theory is, or can be, rationalizing semantic belief as well: but it would still seem to differ
from the rationalizing semantic belief motivated above, and so the “relation” question
would remain.
23
For discussion of explanatory exclusion, see Kim (2005, Chap. 1). It’s suggested
that overdetermination might not be problematic even between the physical and the
intentional by Sider (2003).
24
Henceforth, I will assume—usually silently—that one can always transform as necessary left-hand-side representations of the target sentence.
25
Cf. Larson and Segal (1995, chap. 8). The possibility of formulating Generalized
Quantifier Theory non-set-theoretically is taken up below.
26
Further processing is needed in any event if quantifier phrases contain an unpronounced, contextually determined parameter for domain restriction (cf. Stanley & Szabó (2000)). But determining this parameter—i.e., universally instantiating the relevant
variable in the cognized T-theorem—would still leave us with a non-homophonic T-sentence concerning sets and their cardinalities. Again, context-sensitivity is orthogonal to
our discussion.
27
Larson and Segal do not explain their own interest in restoring homophonicity; so,
it should not be assumed that they intend to address some version of the “relation”
question. Note also that some more general comprehension schema is needed if we are
to avoid positing cognition of a distinct analogue of (12.c.) and (12.d) for each relevant
term. In accounting for cognitive competence, however, it’s not clear that such a schema
must be constrained to avoid paradoxical results. Cf. Patterson (2008).
28
See Asher & Morreau (1995)-and on generics generally the collection in which it
appears: Carlson & Pelletier (1995). On mass terms, see Pelletier & Schubert (2003).
29
More sophistication potentially lurks in the semantic value t, which Pietroski (2003,
pp. 221-3, and 2005, p. 34, fn. 5) doubts corresponds to truth. His reasons, however, in
part have to do with his views on context-sensitivity, which we have bracketed.
30
Exceptions tend to be more philosophically-minded semanticists (including, admittedly, prominent neo-Davidsonians). Cf. Larson and Segal (1995, pp. 140-4) and Ludlow
(1999, chap. 4). Even for them, however, minimizing non-obvious ontological commitment is not a goal per se, but rather a consideration if it receives independent metaphys-
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ical support. For some discussion, see Gross (2006). As for Pietroski, the conceptual
and empirical grounds he offers in favor of his approach nowhere advert to a desire to
avoid conceptual sophistication or ontological commitment. In fact, Pietroski (2003, pp.
222-3, fn. 7, and 2005, p. 7f.) emphasizes the difference between the statement of
truth-conditions provided by disquotation and those provided by an explanatory semantic theory. Though I’ve drawn upon his work in laying out a strategy for answering the
“relation” question, I doubt it is one he would himself endorse in full generality.
31
The inference from ‘John swam briefly’ to ‘John swam’ gets represented, roughly,
as an inference from ‘There was something that was a swimming, done by John, and
brief’ to ‘There was something that was a swimming and done by John.’ The standard
treatment of tense above provides another example of a fruitful application of eventish
semantics. And, as we’ve seen, Pietroski generalizes the approach.
32
Cf. Gross (2006). I adapt talk of cognitive equivalence relative to a presupposition
from Field (1994, p. 250). It might seem that a problem arises with sentences explicitly
about the presupposed entities. Consider, for example, a sentence that explicitly denies
the existence of sets. Is it cognized that this sentence is true iff, on the supposition that
sets exist, sets don’t exist? If so, the target sentence is cognized to have contradictory
truth-conditions. This is not the case, however, if we distinguish (as would seem plausible, given their distinct functional roles) two concepts: SET1 (which plays a central role,
let’s assume, in cognized truth-theories) and SET2 (which is lexicalized by the term ‘set’).
These concepts need not even be identical in content—cf. fn. 27 above.
33
Cf. Frege (1906, p. 299). A strengthened version would require the inverse as well.
To handle “Mates-cases,” one might require that ‘A’ and ‘B’ not contain intensional contexts. (Cf. Segal (2003), pp. 416-8.) This would block application to ’means-that’ claims,
though not to T-sentences. (Segal (2003), also mentions—and in one case discusses—some other complications and objections not mentioned here.)
34
This argument requires that the nominalist be a revolutionary nominalist, not a
hermeneutic nominalist. The former holds that belief in (10) commits one to sets; the
latter holds that it doesn’t, given a proper nominalistic understanding of what (10) actually says. (Cf. Burgess & Rosen (1997), pp. 6-7, from whom I borrow these labels.) (The
argument of course does not require that one be a nominalist, as would some replies
to the “relation” question covered above in section D.) The argument also requires that
merely cognizing not amount to belief, otherwise the nominalist does believe that P, if
the account of semantic competence is correct. Alternatively, one might rephrase the
criterion—e.g. in terms of conscious belief, or by changing the antecedent condition to
believing P while believing not Q without irrationality (assuming one can cognize Q and
believe not Q without irrationality). The argument and the succeeding discussion turn
on ontological claims or presuppositions. But I don’t mean to suggest that one could try
to wield the Frege-Criterion only by adverting to such cases.
35
Kripke (1979). Peter knows of both the famous pianist named ‘Paderewski’ and the
great statesman of that name, but he doesn’t know that they are the same person—and
he doesn’t believe that a great statesman can have musical talent. It seems correct both
that he believes and disbelieves that Paderewski has musical talent.
36
Bach’s (1997, p. 238) formulation has it that the “certain thing” requires the truth of
the proposition that P. My formulation incorporates Bach’s clarification (personal communication) of what he intends by ‘requires.’
37
Stalnaker (1984 and Stalnaker (1999)) defends such a coarse conception of con-
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tent. He assays replies to standard objections—e.g., that such a conception assigns all
mathematical claims the same content, is motivated by a conception of belief and other
attitudes that seems to require that subjects be logically omniscient, and has particular
difficulty otherwise accounting for the intuitions concerning “cognitive significance” that
motivate the Frege-Criterion (see below).
38
See, e.g., Larson and Segal (1995, pp. 545-8). (They leave open whether the representation is explicit or implicit.) See, e.g, Fodor (1989) for his doubts concerning a role
for propositional semantic knowledge in production and comprehension. For replies, see
Segal (1994), Lepore (1997), and Matthews (2003).
39
Confronted with a spoken sentence, it’s the information captured in the semantic
theory that enables one to relate it (under the appropriate syntactic representation) to a
Mentalese representation—viz., the right-hand-side of the T-sentence, fit now to be sent
to the “belief-box” if one takes the speaker at her word. Conversely, in production, it’s the
same generated T-sentence that enables one to match a content one intends to express
with the appropriate phonological form, given its relation to the syntactic representation
that occurs on the T-sentence’s left-hand-side.
40
This is how Fodor handles the more standard “Frege cases”—e.g., Hesperus / Phospherus cases—to which his discussion is addressed: the vehicular difference between
the concept HESPERUS and the concept PHOSPHERUS explains differences in cognitive
significance among complex representations containing them.
41
One might try to explain variation in cognitive significance by appeal, not to differences in content or in vehicle, but to differences in functional role, which Fodor (1990)
allows as a third kind of possible difference between states. Fodor (1998), however,
passes over this third possibility, presumably because vehicles are individuated by functional role. To resuscitate the strategy, one might try to justify a distinction between
aspects of functional role that do and don’t contribute to vehicle-individuation. Alternatively, one might distinguish two senses of functional role, tied respectively to intrinsic
causal power and causal potential given extrinsic circumstances (e.g., isolation within a
module). The point made in the main text’s next paragraph would apply to these moves
too, however. (For some discussion of Fodor on vehicle-individuation, see Aydede (1998)
and Schneider (2005).)
42
Though this proposition is reasonably described as “about language,” it might mislead if one were to label it—the proposition, as opposed to some of the sentences that
express it—‘meta-linguistic.’ On the Stalnakerian view, this proposition is coarse and
unstructured like any other.
43
It might be replied that the differences in ascribers’ practices itself reflects differences
in the states: it’s because of the difference in states that ascribers use belief-ascriptions
with truth-conditions that systematically vary in these ways. But then one is positing a
difference in state after all—in other words, one has abandoned the attempt to argue
that in the cases at issue there is one state characterized in two ways.
44
The qualification “at least in the typical case” accommodates such atypical cases as
when someone knows but one sentence of a language and, on the basis of this knowledge
(which she can only express in some other language) utters the sentence in communicating what it means.
45
Because generating the T-theorem for ‘ ‘S’ means that S’ requires more resources than
generating the T-theorem for ‘S,’ one might suggest that understanding a claim concerning what a sentence means is a further achievement beyond understanding the sentence
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itself. It is true that they are distinct achievements and that one requires richer conceptual
resources than the other. However, it is less clear that understanding ‘S’ is developmentally prior to understanding ‘ ‘S’ means that S’. Children exhibit awareness of language
at a surprisingly early age—with clear indications of awareness by age 2 and explicit
meta-linguistic claims by age 3, at least with respect to some aspects of language. See
Clark (1978). According to my psycholinguistic informants, however, there is a dearth
of good techniques for gathering hard evidence concerning specifically early semantic
awareness. Though the hypothesis of developmental priority is indeed very plausible,
this is clearly an empirical question—albeit one with a (quasi-)conceptual component
concerning what constitutes (sufficient) understanding. It’s worth noting that, although
competent articulation is sufficient for linguistic understanding and for consciousness of
what’s thereby expressed (a point pressed into service earlier), an ability to competently
articulate is arguably not necessary for either. (This is clear for linguistic understanding.
The situation is more complicated, however, for consciousness, especially concerning
conceptually complex beliefs.) Further, both consciousness (awareness) and understanding require the proper exercise of capacities that go beyond merely believing something
(say, that ‘ ‘S’ means that S’) and/or cognizing something (say, the T-theorem for ‘S’).
This opens up in particular the following possibility: that even for very young children
the belief that ‘ ‘S’ means that S’ might play a role in linguistic production and comprehension and be consciously accessible—while yet being “blocked” from conscious access
(and thus articulation) by something extrinsic to the belief-state (e.g., because further
necessary capacities have yet to develop). If this were so, then this paper’s restriction to
mature speakers could be dropped. Of course, one would first have to develop the necessary distinctions and make their application empirically plausible. Depending on the
details, it would be a question whether cognized T-theories are in this sense accessible to
consciousness too. Cf. Block (1990) in reply to Searle (1990).
46
“Non-inferential” because we are supposing that the third reply to the “relation”
question fails to garner empirical support.
47
One might try arguing as well for a metaphysical relation between the cognized
T-theorem and the homophonic semantic belief. The idea would be that one’s cognizing
the compositional semantic theory in part constitutes, or makes true, the semantic facts
the beliefs are about. (Or perhaps the cognition and the conscious semantic belief co-play
this role.) Developing this, however, would require unbracketing the question of the
proper object of semantic cognition and belief (e.g., idiolects or “public” languages).
48
For invaluable feedback, I thank Peter Achinstein, Kent Bach, Stephen Butterfill,
John Collins, Claire Horisk, Peter Ludlow, Josep Macia, Paul Pietroski, Gabriel Uzquiano,
and audiences at Georgia, ESPP 2005 Lund, Queen’s (Canada), Northwestern, Ohio
State, Illinois (Chicago), Georgetown, Johns Hopkins, and the Inter-University Centre
(Dubrovnik). Apologies to anyone I’ve inadvertently omitted. Material related to this paper was also presented at the Penn Humanities Forum and Boston University. A preliminary version of some sections appeared in the Croatian Journal of Philosophy. It was my
original intention to present this material as well at the 5th International Symposium for
Cognition, Logic and Information: Meaning, and Understanding and Knowledge (Riga
2009), from which this volume is drawn—until I saw that a fair number of the others
coming had heard it already. Instead, I asked “Do Kids Know What We Mean?” in reply
to Guy Longworth’s excellent 2008 paper on linguistic understanding. I hope to publish
some descendent of those remarks in the future. Warm thanks to the organizers—e-
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specially Jurgis Skilters, Doug Patterson, and Sandra Lapointe—both for an excellent
symposium and for allowing me to publish this paper instead.
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